Monday, November 27, 2017

The Feckless Thuggery of Anthony Scaramucci's Defamation Threat

The Feckless Thuggery of Anthony Scaramucci's Defamation Threat

Anthony Scaramucci, former White House communications director, a man with a temper, a narrow-band vocabulary and an improbably inflated sense of Steve Bannon's flexibility, has threatened a defamation suit over a student op-ed in the Tufts Daily. The threat — made through Scaramucci's counsel, Sam Lieberman of Sadis & Goldberg LLP — is every bit as blustery and frivolous as the players and circumstances would suggest.

In the op-ed, Tufts student Camilo A. Caballero argued that Scaramucci should not sit on Tuft's Board of Advisors. Scaramucci's letter calls out several passages in the op-ed:

A man who is irresponsible, inconsistent, an unethical opportunist and who exuded the highest degree of disreputability should not be on the Fletcher Board.

This is Anthony Scaramucci, a man who began his infamously short career as the White House communications director by uttering profanity-laced comments on national news outlets, the man who sold his soul in contradiction to his own purported beliefs for a seat in that White House and a man who makes his Twitter accessible to friends interested in giving comfort to Holocaust deniers.

(The links in the second passage above are in the original piece.)

Scaramucci's letter also calls out Caballero's November 13, 2017 follow-up op-ed:

In addition, the administration has announced its intentions to invite Scaramucci to campus to discuss his “experiences in the private and public sectors, and lessons learned.” This invitation by Tufts and the Fletcher School, as the first statement/response they have put out since the student/faculty petition, the Tufts Daily op-ed and the Boston Globe article, is a way to give Scaramucci a platform to legitimize his unethical behavior.

. . .

But as we know now, Scaramucci has shown his intentions while in the White House as well as in his public statements that he cares about gaining attention and nothing more, and we should not let this distract us from what the administration wishes to avoid having to take up and answer.

Lieberman's letter on behalf of Scaramucci is frivolous, thuggish, and an example of the modern trend of people with money believing that they should be protected from criticism through abuse of the legal system.

As I've discussed here many times before, only provable statements of fact can be defamatory. An opinion that does not imply a provably false statement of fact cannot be defamatory and is absolutely protected by the First Amendment. Courts deciding whether a statement is potentially defamatory fact or absolutely protected opinion look at the totality of the circumstances, including the entire context and the viewpoint of people familiar with the publication and the figures discussed. Here, multiple factors rather conclusively establish that the statements Scaramucci complains of are protected opinion. First, the columns are expressly labeled as editorial and opinion. This isn't dispositive but strongly frames the context. Second, the editorials are about a controversial political figure. Courts are far more likely to interpret statements about politics and political figures as opinion rather than fact, and to treat comments therein as rhetorical hyperbole rather than as provable literal fact. Third, the statements are couched in heated rhetoric that makes it far more likely to be treated as opinion — it's difficult to imagine a court that would treat "sold his soul" as a statement of provable fact. Fourth, rather than implying undisclosed and potentially provably false facts, the author repeatedly offers links demonstrating the basis for his opinions. For instance, the statement that Scaramucci "sold his soul" is linked to a scathing opinion piece arguing that Scaramucci's acceptance of a job in the Trump administration contradicted his past rhetoric about the Republican party. Hence, "sold his soul" is clearly a characterization of Scaramucci's decision to accept a job — and notably Scaramucci's letter does not quarrel with any of the underlying factual assertions about what Scaramucci said before about the Republican party. Similarly, Scaramucci complains that the op-ed says he gave comfort on Twitter to Holocaust deniers. Once again, the author provided a link establishing what he was talking about — an imbecilic Scaramucci Post tweet asking Twitter users to vote on how many Jews were killed in the Holocaust, as if historical facts are resolved by a vote on a platform squirming with bigots and trolls. Once again, this is an argumentative characterization of Scaramucci's action, not a provably false statement of fact.

Lieberman's letter strains mightily to distinguish well-established law that would demonstrate that these claims are frivolous. For instance, Lieberman cites Van Liew v. Eliopoulos, 84 N.E.2d 898 (2017), a recent Massachusetts Court of Appeal case, for the proposition that accusing someone of "ethical violations" could be defamatory rather than merely opinion. That case is not remotely apt and the citation is highly misleading. In Van Liew, the plaintiff established that the defendant had made specific provably false statements of fact: that the plaintiff was under investigation by the Attorney General's office, that he lied to officials, and that his actions in connection with a sale of property were in violation of specific ethical rules governing his position as a public official. In other words, the case involved specific allegations about specific actions, not a general rhetorical allegation that the plaintiff was unethical. The citation to the case is empty and cynical.

Lieberman's letter also engages in a rhetorical trick I expect to see on Twitter and Reddit, not in a letter from an attorney. Lieberman cites a series of cases saying that accusing Scaramucci of lack of ethics is "defamation per se." But "defamation per se" refers to the doctrine that, with respect to certain types of defamation, the plaintiff need not specially prove damages, because some amount of damages will be presumed. The doctrine does not excuse the plaintiff from any of the other elements of a defamation case — like proving that the statement is a provably false statement of fact or that the speaker (in the case of a public figure) knew it was false or acted with reckless disregard as to its falsity.

Lieberman's letter ends by piling on more argument about Scaramucci's moronic Twitter poll about the Holocaust. This is simply insipid. The op-ed, which linked to the story about the tweet, self-evidently offers a non-provable opinion that taking Twitter polls about Holocaust deaths gives comfort to Holocaust deniers. As I've discussed here repeatedly before, characterizing someone's actions as racist is classic opinion. Lieberman cites Herlihy v. Metro. Museum of Art, 608 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1994) for the proposition that an accusation of antisemitism can be defamatory. Once again Lieberman is misleading the reader. In Herlihy the plaintiff accused the defendant of entirely fabricating a series of antisemitic statements by the plaintiff; the case did not involve a dispute over whether the plaintiff's actions could be characterized as racist. Put another way, the defamation there was claiming the plaintiff said something she didn't say at all, not arguing that her undisputed words made her racist.

Scaramucci's letter is vexatious, meritless, dishonest, and thuggish. A decent lawyer would not draft it and a decent man would not have it sent on his behalf. It represents the growing trend of the wealthy leveraging a broken legal system to suppress criticism. It is entirely consistent with Scaramucci's past conduct as a vain, bumbling lout, and inconsistent with his attempts to rehabilitate himself. For shame.

Copyright 2017 by the named Popehat author. https://www.popehat.com/2017/11/27/the-feckless-thuggery-of-anthony-scaramuccis-defamation-threat/

Wednesday, November 22, 2017

Popehat Signal: Ugh, Really? OK. Everyone Has A Right To Free Speech.

Popehat Signal: Ugh, Really? OK. Everyone Has A Right To Free Speech.

New Popehat Signal courtesy of Nigel Lew. Thanks, Nigel!

When I was about 11 a few other socially inept morally spavined twerps and I recorded fake radio shows on my primitive cassette tape machine. It was mostly fart jokes, inarticulate inside-baseball ridicule of people we didn't like, and snort-laughing.

I was born too soon. Apparently these days you can make thousands of dollars a month for that sort of thing.

Let me preface this with my biases: I hate everyone in this case. I hate their ethos. I hate their culture. I hate how they pollute American discourse. Based on a representative sample I hate their fans. They are the groin flop-sweat of wretched post-modernity, the web's genetic-cul-de-sac Morlocks gaping dumbly at the slimy shrill-voiced megaphones of the parties to this case.

Nevertheless, the case involves significant First Amendment issues, which may be resolved in a way that impairs everybody's rights unless the defendants have competent counsel, which these days is ruinously expensive. This is how rights are trammelled: when we don't defend them because the defendants at hand are loathsome. Therefore, I respectfully request assistance.

The case at hand involved "internet personality" George Ouzounian, known as "Maddox." Maddox has filed suit in New York state court, alleging a dog's breakfast of causes of action against defendants including other web personalities, their employers, web platform Patreon, one of Patreon's executives, and others. The heart of the case is a tiresome dispute amongst online "comics" who have various podcasts and publications. You can find (no doubt biased) backstories of the conflict places like here and here; they are every bit as incomprehensible and tedious as you would expect of obsessive chronicles of the drooling slap-fights of online trolls. The core of the complaint is the allegation that the defendants engaged in — or tolerated, or endorsed — a campaign of harassment against Maddox, a rival.

I don't claim that every act alleged in the complaint is protected by the First Amendment — I haven't done that thorough of an analysis. However, the complaint has many of the hallmarks of vexatious and frivolous litigation calculated to chill protected speech. It seeks to hold content providers liable for the loathsome online behavior of their fans. Even if some of the defendants' speech crosses the line into defamation (and I don't know whether it does), the complaint treats online satire, ridicule, and criticism as an undifferentiated mass, and unquestionably sweeps up a substantial amount of clearly protected speech. The complaint treats boycotts and calls for boycotts as actionable. It purports to hold Patreon and one of Patreon's executives liable for failure to kick the defendants off of the platform. It names one of the defendants' employers as a party, asserting that the employer is liable for the employee's obviously non-work-related dipshittery. It demands prior restraint on speech and court-mandated apologies, both of which are patently unconstitutional. These are all elements of bad-faith censorious litigation. If they are tolerated — even against utter turds like some of the defendants — they metastasize, become precedent, and can be used more freely against you and me and people everywhere.

As I often say in these Popehat Signal posts, even an utterly frivolous suit, shot through with clear indicia of bogosity, is cheap at easy to file but ruinously expensive to the vast majority of Americans to defend. That's how censorious thugs and litigation terrorists suppress speech — by leveraging a system that gives everyone, rich or poor, the right to spend tens of thousands of dollars on an adequate constitutional defense. The more they succeed, the more thugs will file suit.

One of the individual defendants, though employed, has a modest salary and is burdened by medical debt and has grave difficulty affording counsel. If you are a lawyer admitted in New York, please consider helping him, because we defend the First Amendment and everybody's rights when we defend the speech of vile people and push back against litigation abuse.

Copyright 2017 by the named Popehat author. https://www.popehat.com/2017/11/22/popehat-signal-ugh-really-ok-everyone-has-a-right-to-free-speech/

Thursday, November 9, 2017

Randazza: Even Trump has a right to free speech

Randazza: Even Trump has a right to free speech

By Marc Randazza

When then-presidential candidate Trump uttered the words, “Get’em out of here,” at one of his rallies, Trump’s supporters assaulted three anti-Trump protestors. The protestors now want to hold Trump liable for the assault, based on his speech alone.

While I do not approve of Trump’s words, I am honor-bound to defend his right to free speech, as I have oft repeated the famous Voltaire misquote: "I Disapprove of What You Say, But I Will Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It." I am disturbed that many people, including fellow free speech advocates, are willing to turn their back on this principle in this case. In my opinion, people are blinded by their negative views of Trump, so refuse to think critically on this issue, a problem I call Trump Derangement Syndrome (“TDS”).

The Sixth Circuit is now reviewing whether Trump’s words are actionable, and if these claims survive, it will chill free speech. I discuss this development in the case in my latest CNN column, which hopefully will be an immunity booster for any readers here suffering from TDS. See Even Trump has a right to free speech.

Copyright 2017 by the named Popehat author. https://www.popehat.com/2017/11/09/randazza-even-trump-has-a-right-to-free-speech/

Tuesday, November 7, 2017

Hate Debate, Revisited

Hate Debate, Revisited

My debate with Elie Mystal on hate speech laws from earlier this year got turned into a More Perfect podcast episode. Fun.

Copyright 2017 by the named Popehat author. https://www.popehat.com/2017/11/07/hate-debate-revisited/

Excerpts From The Congressional Testimony of Carter Page

Excerpts From The Congressional Testimony of Carter Page

Copyright 2017 by the named Popehat author. https://www.popehat.com/2017/11/07/excerpts-from-the-congressional-testimony-of-carter-page/

Friday, November 3, 2017

California Supreme Court Adopts Ethical Rule Requiring Prosecutors To . . . Wait, How Was This Not Already A Rule?

California Supreme Court Adopts Ethical Rule Requiring Prosecutors To . . . Wait, How Was This Not Already A Rule?

Good news. Yesterday, the California Supreme Court approved revisions to the California Rules of Professional Conduct governing the ethical duties of prosecutors in California. The Revised Rule 5-110 includes the obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence (so-called Brady evidence, after Brady v. Maryland):

(D) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;

The key part of the revised Rule is the note to it clarifying that the obligation is not based on a prosecutor's own assessment of the value of the exculpatory evidence:

[3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (D) are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S. Ct. 1194] and its progeny. For example, these obligations include, at a minimum, the duty to disclose impeachment evidence or information that a prosecutor knows or reasonably should know casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony on which the prosecution intends to rely. Paragraph (D) does not require disclosure of information protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by case law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure’s timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and paragraph (D) is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.

What does that mean? Prosecutors have an constitutional obligation to turn over evidence that tends to negate the defendant's guilt (so-called Brady) evidence) or undermine the credibility of the government's witnesses (so-called Giglio evidence). But some California prosecutors have asserted that the obligation only extends to evidence that they believe is material and turthful — that is, evidence that the prosecutor subjectively believes is credible could make a difference in the outcome of the case. But that's not the law; it's not for an advocate for one side to decide whether evidence is credible material or useful to the other side. There's been litigation over it, including a lawsuit by the ACLU against the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office that led to changes in policy.

Though the California State Bar remains regrettably weak in imposing consequences on prosecutors for violations of their ethical and constitutional obligations, this revised rule is a stride in the right direction. The Rule reflects a clear judgment that prosecutors (at least state prosecutors — federal prosecutors have sometimes claimed that they are not bound by state ethical rules that contradict federal policy) can't withhold exculpatory evidence based on their subjective belief that it's not credible or not useful to the defense or wouldn't make a difference.

Congrats to the advocates who succeeded in pushing this Rule change through, including Professor Laurie Levenson.

Copyright 2017 by the named Popehat author. https://www.popehat.com/2017/11/03/california-supreme-court-adopts-ethical-rule-requiring-prosecutors-to-wait-how-was-this-not-already-a-rule/

Thursday, November 2, 2017

Sorry Facebook, Blasphemy Is Not Apolitical

Sorry Facebook, Blasphemy Is Not Apolitical

Popehat is pleased to offer a third guest post by Sarah McLaughlin. Sarah works for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (though the opinions expressed here are her own) and is interested in free speech and civil liberties. You can follow her on Twitter at @sarahemclaugh. Her previous posts on blasphemy and speech issues are here and here.

This week, Twitter, Facebook, and Google officials testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on the impact of Russia’s utilization of social media in the 2016 election. During a line of questioning about the pressure that governments put on Facebook to censor political content, Facebook VP and General Counsel Colin Stretch explained to Sen. Marco Rubio that Facebook geoblocks content when governments flag it as a violation of local law, making it unavailable to users in that country. Stretch provided Holocaust denial in Germany as an example.

When pressed by Rubio on whether Facebook would block political criticism at the request of a government entity, Stretch noted that Facebook takes a “nuanced approach” and promised that “political expression is at the core of what we provide.”

Then Stretch offered this curious comment: “In the vast majority of cases where we are on notice of locally illegal content, it has nothing to do with political expression. It’s things like blasphemy in parts of the world that prohibit blasphemy.”1

Blasphemy is apolitical? That’s a stretch — and one that requires a near-willful misunderstanding of the reality of the speech targeted by blasphemy laws and religious speech itself. Stretch’s assertion deserves careful review considering both the power which Facebook yields over internet speech and the prevalence of blasphemy laws.2

When a government entity acts on its authority to determine how to classify blasphemous speech, it is inherently political: The state is determining which challenges are permitted to religious authorities, and which are not, and which belief systems deserve forced reverence, and which do not. And the more religion is entrenched in a system of governance, the harder it is to separate religious criticisms from political ones.

In May, The Guardian decried the ease with which Indonesia’s blasphemy law has been wielded as a political cudgel. Ahok, Jakarta’s Christian governor, was awarded a harsh two-year jail sentence for quoting the Quran to voters in an allegedly deceiving way. Months later, an Indonesian doctor took to Facebook to criticize protesters who demanded Ahok’s imprisonment. He, too, was brought up on blasphemy charges. Is this speech — which led to the arrest of two men under Indonesia’s blasphemy laws — the kind that Facebook believes has “nothing to do with political expression”?

It’s worth nothing that Indonesia’s law is likely to become even more expansive. A draft bill set to be discussed this year would punish under Indonesia’s blasphemy law “[e]veryone who persuades another person to leave his or her confessed faith” and “[e]veryone who deliberately persuades and provokes other people to reject the existence of adherents of a particular religion.” It’s easy to imagine the vast array of speech that would be criminalized under such an expansive definition of blasphemy.

And in Pakistan — where blasphemers can face the death penalty — merely criticizing the blasphemy law itself can violate the blasphemy law. How convenient. Late last year, a blasphemy case was registered against Shaan Taseer — son of governor Salmaan Taseer, who was murdered by his bodyguard for speaking out against Pakistan’s blasphemy law — after Shaan posted a video in which he called for the repeal of the blasphemy law and the release of Christians imprisoned in Pakistan for blasphemy charges. This is without a doubt political speech — and it is illegal under Pakistan’s brutal blasphemy law.

What about speech discussing animal slaughter? Is that political? In 2016, an Egyptian court handed down a three-year jail sentence to a columnist found guilty of blasphemy for a Facebook post decrying what she perceived as a ritualistic sheep slaughter.

Or what about activist Raif Badawi, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes for blasphemy charges for the crime of running a website dedicated to engaging in religious and political debate within Saudi Arabia? Is that a simple case of blasphemy, devoid of all political expression? Clearly not. Again and again, governments prove that blasphemy laws are malleable tools just begging to be abused.

Putting that aside, it is unclear why Stretch seems to believe that it would be more problematic for Facebook to remove “political expression” than “blasphemy.” Assuming that the two could be clearly demarcated, is it really that much better to remove a personal statement about faith rather than a political declaration?

Ultimately, regardless of the wisdom or morality of its stance, Facebook can censor whatever speech it wants, whether requests for censorship come from individual users or government entities. But Facebook’s argument that censorship of the “blasphemous” is discernible from censorship of the “political” should be met with derision.

Popehat's past coverage of how blasphemy laws are used to abuse political, racial and religious minorities can be found here.

Copyright 2017 by the named Popehat author. https://www.popehat.com/2017/11/02/sorry-facebook-blasphemy-is-not-apolitical/